We present the first formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian cards problem, and provide rigorous security definitions that capture both basic and extended versions of weak and perfect security notions. In the generalized Russian cards problem, three players, Alice, Bob, and Cathy, are dealt a deck of n cards, each given a, b, and c cards, respectively. The goal is for Alice and Bob to learn each other's hands via public communication, without Cathy learning the fate of any particular card. The basic idea is that Alice announces a set of possible hands she might hold, and Bob, using knowledge of his own hand, should be able to learn Alice's cards from this announcement, but Cathy should not. Using a combinatorial approach, we are able to give a nice characterization of informative strategies (i.e., strategies allowing Bob to learn Alice's hand), having optimal communication complexity, namely the set of possible hands Alice announces must be equivalent to a large set of t − (n, a, 1)-designs, where t = a − c. We also provide some interesting necessary conditions for certain types of deals to be simultaneously informative and secure. That is, for deals satisfying c = a − d for some d ≥ 2, where b ≥ d − 1 and the strategy is assumed to satisfy a strong version of security (namely perfect (d − 1)-security), we show that a = d + 1 and hence c = 1. We also give a precise characterization of informative and perfectly (d − 1)-secure deals of the form (d + 1, b, 1) satisfying b ≥ d − 1 involving d − (n, d + 1, 1)-designs.
Introduction
Suppose X is a deck of n cards, and we have three participants, Alice, Bob and Cathy. Let a + b + c = n and suppose that Alice is dealt a hand of a cards, Bob is dealt a hand of b cards and Cathy is dealt a hand of c cards. These hands are random and dealt by some entity external to the scheme. We denote Alice's hand by H A , Bob's hand by H B and Cathy's hand by H C . Of course it must be the case that H A ∪ H B ∪ H C = X. We refer to this as an (a, b, c)-deal of the cards.
For a positive integer t, let X t denote the set of n t t-subsets of X. An announcement by Alice A is a subset of X a . It is required that when Alice makes an announcement A, the hand she holds is one of the a-subsets in A. The goal of the scheme is that, after a deal has taken place and Alice has made an announcement, Bob should be able to determine Alice's hand, but Cathy should not be able to determine if Alice holds any particular card not held by Cathy. These notions will be formalized as we proceed. We remark that we focus on the scenario of Bob learning Alice's hand, although the original version of this problem is for Bob and Alice to learn each other's hand. We omit the latter case, since for any protocol whereby Bob may learn Alice's hand, Bob may then announce Cathy's hand publicly. This second step provides sufficient information for Alice to determine Bob's hand, without giving Cathy any more information than she previously had.
This problem was first introduced in the case (a, b, c) = (3, 3, 1) in the 2000 Moscow Mathematics Olympiad. Since then, there have been numerous papers investigating the problem (called the Russian cards problem) and generalizations of it. Some are interested in card deal protocols that allow players to agree on a common secret without a given eavesdropper being able to determine this secret value. This area of research is especially interesting in terms of possible applications to key generation; see, for example [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 16, 2] . Others are concerned with analyzing variations of the problem using epistemic logic [18, 19, 20, 7] . Duan and Yang [9] and He and Duan [15] consider a special generalization, with n − 1 players each dealt n cards, and one player (the intruder) dealt one card; the authors give an algorithm by which a dealer, acting as a trusted third party, can construct announcements for each player. Recently, there have been some papers that take a combinatorial approach [1, 3, 2, 4] , which we discuss in some detail in Section 5.
We take a combinatorial point of view motivated by cryptographic considerations. To be specific, we provide definitions based on security conditions in the unconditionally secure framework, phrased in terms of probability distributions regarding information available to the various players (analogous to Shannon's definitions relating to perfect secrecy of a cryptosystem). In particular, we provide a formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian cards problem. We introduce rigorous mathematical definitions of security, which in turn allows for systematic and thorough analysis of proposed protocols. We then give necessary conditions and provide constructions for schemes that satisfy the relevant definitions. Here there is a natural interplay with combinatorics.
Overview of Contributions
The main contributions of our work are as follows:
• We provide a formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian Cards problem.
In particular, we define an announcement strategy for Alice, which designates a probability distribution on a fixed set of possible announcements A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m Alice can make. In keeping with standard practice in cryptography (i.e., Kerckhoff's principle), we assume that Alice's announcement strategy is public knowledge. Security through obscurity is not considered an effective security method, as secrets are difficult to keep; providing security under the assumption the adversary has full knowledge of the set-up of the given scheme is therefore the goal. This allows us to define the communication complexity of the protocol to be log 2 m bits, since Alice need only broadcast the index i of her chosen announcement, which is an integer between 1 and m. In order to minimize the communication complexity of the scheme, our goal will be to minimize m, the number of possible announcements.
• We examine necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be informative for Bob, i.e. strategies that allow Bob to determine Alice's hand. In particular, we give a lower bound on the communication complexity m for informative strategies and provide a nice combinatorial characterization of strategies that meet this bound, which we term optimal strategies.
• We provide the first formal security definitions that account for both weak and perfect security in an unconditionally secure framework. We remark that current literature focuses on weak security. In addition, we provide simpler, but equivalent combinatorial security conditions that apply when Alice's strategy is equitable. Here weak and perfect security are defined with respect to individual cards. If a scheme satisfies weak security (which we will term weak 1-security), Cathy should not be able to say whether a given card is held by Alice or Bob; if a scheme satisfies perfect security (which we will term perfect 1-security), each card is equally likely to be held by Alice.
• We use constructions and results from the field of combinatorial designs to explore strategies that are simultaneously informative and perfectly secure; this is especially useful for the case c = 1. In particular, we analyze the case c = a − 2 in detail, and show that strategies for (a, b, a − 2)-deals that are simultaneously informative and perfectly secure must satisfy c = 1. We also show a precise characterization between Steiner triple systems and (3, n − 4, 1)-deals.
• We generalize our notions of weak and perfect security, which focus on the probability that individual cards are held by Alice, and consider instead the probability that a given set of cards (of cardinality less than or equal to a) is held by Alice. We consider deals satisfying c = a − d and achieve parallel results to the c = a − 2 case.
Preliminary Notation and Examples
Alice will choose a set of announcements, say A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m such that every H A ∈ X a is in at least one of the m announcements. For H A ∈ X a , define g(H A ) = {i : H A ∈ A i }. Alice's announcement strategy, or more simply, strategy, consists of a probability distribution p H A on g(H A ), for every H A ∈ X a . The set of announcements and probability distributions are fixed ahead of time and they are public knowledge. We will use the phrase (a, b, c)-strategy to denote a strategy for an (a, b, c)-deal. In addition, we will assume without loss of generality that p H A (i) > 0 for all i ∈ g(H A ). To see this, note that if p H A (i) = 0 for some H A ∈ X a and i ∈ g(H A ), this means Alice will never choose A i when she holds H A . But since the set of announcements and probability distributions are public knowledge, Cathy also knows this, so there is no reason to have included H A in the announcement A i .
When Alice is dealt a hand H A ∈ X a , she randomly chooses an index i ∈ g(H A ) according to the probability distribution p H A . Alice broadcasts the integer i to specify her announcement A i . Because the set of announcements and probability distributions are fixed and public, the only information that is broadcast by Alice is the index i, which is an integer between 1 and m. Therefore we define the communication complexity of the protocol to be log 2 m bits. In order to minimize the communication complexity of the scheme, our goal will be to minimize m, the number of possible announcements.
If |g(H A )| = 1 for every H A , then we have a deterministic scheme, because the hand H A held by Alice uniquely determines the index i that she will broadcast. That is to say, in a deterministic Figure 1 : A deterministic (3, 3, 1)-strategy having a set of six possible announcements scheme, for any given hand, there is only one possible announcement that is permitted by the given strategy. More generally, suppose there exists a constant γ such that |g(H A )| = γ for every H A . Further, suppose that every probability distribution p H A is uniform, i.e., p H A (i) = 1/γ for every H A and for every i ∈ g(H A ). We refer to such a strategy as a γ-equitable strategy. A deterministic scheme is just a 1-equitable strategy. Figure 2 , we present a set of ten announcements found by Don Kreher (private communication). It can be verified that every 3-subset of X occurs in exactly two of these announcements. Therefore we have a 2-equitable (3, 3, 1)-strategy.
Organization of the Paper
In Section 2, we study and define the notions of informative, weakly 1-secure, and perfectly 1-secure strategies. In Section 3, we explore strategies that are simultaneously informative and either weakly or perfectly 1-secure, and include an analysis of perfectly 1-secure strategies with c = a − 2 in Section 3.1. We present a generalization of the notions of weak and perfect 1-security and analyze the case of perfectly (d − 1)-secure strategies satisfying c = a − d in Section 4. We conclude in Section 6.
Informative and Secure Strategies

Strategies that are Informative for Bob
Let's first consider an (a, b, c)-deal from Bob's point of view, after hearing Alice's announcement. Suppose that H B ∈ X b and i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Define
2 {2, 5, 6}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 4, 6}, {1, 3, 5}, {0, 4, 5}, {0, 3, 6}, {0, 1, 2} 3 {3, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6}, {1, 3, 6}, {1, 2, 5}, {0, 5, 6}, {0, 2, 3}, {0, 1, 4} 4 {3, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6}, {1, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 3}, {0, 3, 6}, {0, 2, 5}, {0, 1, 4} 5 {3, 4, 6}, {2, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 6}, {0, 5, 6}, {0, 2, 4}, {0, 1, 3} 6 {3, 4, 6}, {2, 3, 5}, {1, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 4}, {0, 4, 5}, {0, 2, 6}, {0, 1, 3} 7 {3, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 6}, {0, 4, 6}, {0, 2, 3}, {0, 1, 5} 8 {3, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}, {1, 2, 3}, {0, 3, 4}, {0, 2, 6}, {0, 1, 5} 9 {4, 5, 6}, {2, 3, 6}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {0, 3, 5}, {0, 2, 4}, {0, 1, 6} 10 {4, 5, 6}, {2, 3, 6}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 4}, {0, 3, 4}, {0, 2, 5}, {0, 1, 6} Figure 2 : An equitable (3, 3, 1)-strategy having a set of ten possible announcements P(H B , i) denotes the set of possible hands that Alice might hold, given that Bob's hand is H B and Alice's announcement is A i . Alice's strategy is informative for Bob provided that
for all H B ∈ X b and for all i. In this situation, if Bob holds the cards in H B and Alice broadcasts i, then Bob can determine the set of a cards that Alice holds.
If for a particular announcement A i and any hand H B ∈ X b , we have |P(H B , i)| ≤ 1, we say that A i is an informative announcement. This terminology is in keeping with previous work, which considers protocol characteristics only on the level of individual announcements.
The following result was shown by Albert et al. [1] , albeit using different terminology: 
Proof. Suppose there exist two distinct sets . We will next give a nice combinatorial characterization of such optimal strategies. First, we require some definitions from design theory. Proof. Suppose there exists a large set of (a − c)-(n, a, 1)-designs. Then it is easy to see that this immediately yields an optimal (a, b, c)-strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob.
Conversely, suppose there is an optimal (a, b, c)-strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob. We need to show that every announcement is an (a − c)-(n, a, 1)-design. Denote t = a − c and let announcements, so every announcement must contain a block that contains X ′ .
An optimal (3, 3, 1)-strategy would have m = 5. From Theorem 2.4, the existence of such a strategy would be equivalent to a large set of five STS(7). As mentioned above, it is known that this large set does not exist. However, from Example 1.1, we obtain a (3, 3, 1)-strategy for Alice with m = 6 that is informative for Bob. Thus we have proven the following. 
Strategies that are Secure against Cathy
Now we consider security requirements for an (a, b, c)-strategy. Suppose that Alice makes an announcement A i while trying to conceal information about her hand from Cathy. Necessarily Alice's hand is an a-subset in A i . In fact, Cathy knows that Alice's hand must be one of the a-subsets in the set P(H C , i) = {H A ∈ A i : H A ∩ H C = ∅}. Therefore Cathy does obtain some partial information about Alice's hand. However, it might be possible to prevent Cathy from determining whether any individual card in X\H C is held by Alice or by Bob. We define two versions of this security property:
1. Alice's strategy is weakly 1-secure against Cathy provided that, for any announcement i, for any H C ∈ X c such that P(H C , i) = ∅, and for any x ∈ X\H C , it holds that
Weak security means that, from Cathy's point of view, any individual card in X\H C could be held by either Alice or Bob.
2. Alice's strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy provided that for any announcement i, for any H C ∈ X c such that P(H C , i) = ∅, and for any x ∈ X\H C , it holds that
Perfect security means that, from Cathy's point of view, the probability that any individual card in X\H C is held by Alice is a constant. This probability must equal a/(a + b) because Alice holds a of the a + b cards not held by Cathy.
It is obvious that perfect 1-security implies weak 1-security.
Remark: The condition P(H C , i) = ∅ is included to account for the possibility that an announcement i is not compatible with certain hands H C held by Cathy.
The conditions for weak and perfect 1-security depend on the probability distributions p H A and the possible announcements. We will derive simpler, but equivalent, conditions of a combinatorial nature when Alice's strategy is equitable. First we state and prove a useful lemma which establishes that in an equitable strategy, from Cathy's point of view, any hand H A ∈ P(H C , i) is equally likely.
and H A ∈ P(H C , i). Then
Proof. We have
We can compute
Similarly, we have
The result follows. 
Alice's strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy if and only if, for any announcement i and for any H
Proof. Since (2) holds, it immediately follows that
Using Equation (3), we observe that
This gives the first condition of the theorem.
Alice's strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy if and only if the value Pr[x ∈ H A |i, H C ] is independent of x. From (3), this occurs if and only if r x is independent of x. We have that
There are a + b terms r x in the above sum. These terms are all equal if and only if they all have the value r = a |P(H C , i)|/(a + b). This proves the second condition of the theorem.
Remark:
The above characterization of weak 1-security for equitable strategies is equivalent to axioms CA2 and CA3 in [1] . The characterization of perfect 1-security for equitable strategies is equivalent to axiom CA4 in [3] .
It can be verified that the (3, 3, 1)-strategy in Example 1.2 is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. However, the (3, 3, 1)-strategy in Example 1.1 is only weakly 1-secure against Cathy.
Here is a sufficient condition for a strategy to be perfectly 1-secure against Cathy.
Lemma 2.8. Suppose that each announcement in an equitable (a, b, 1)-strategy is a 2-(n, a, λ)-design. Then the strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy.
Proof. Given an announcement A i and a point x, there are
Each of the points in X\{x} is contained in precisely
of these blocks.
Simultaneously Informative and Secure Strategies
In general, we want to find an (a, b, c)-strategy (for Alice) that is simultaneously informative for Bob and (perfectly or weakly) 1-secure against Cathy.
The following was first shown by Albert et al. [1] using a different proof technique: Proof. In view of Corollary 2.2, we only need to consider the case a = c + 1. In this case, any two a-subsets in an announcement must be disjoint, by Theorem 2.1. For any announcement A i and any x ∈ X, the definition of weak 1-security necessitates the existence of a block in A i that contains x. It therefore follows that every A i forms a partition of X into n/a blocks. Now, suppose that Alice's announcement is A i and Cathy's hand is H C . There exists at least one
The existence of this point violates the requirement of weak 1-security. Proof. If n ≡ 1, 3 mod 6, n > 7, then there exists a large set of disjoint STS(n) on an n-set X. Theorem 2.4 establishes that the resulting strategy is informative for Bob, because no announcement A i (the set of blocks of an STS(n)) contains two blocks that intersect in more than one point. Perfect 1-security follows immediately from Lemma 2.8.
In the case n = 7, there does not exist a large set of STS (7), so we cannot construct an optimal (3, 3, 1)-strategy. However, Example 1.2 provides us with an equitable strategy with m = 10 and γ = 2 that is informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. This is because every announcement in this strategy is an STS(7) and every 3-subset occurs in exactly two announcements. Examples from the literature for this case typically only provide weak 1-security. Atkinson et al. [3] give a solution for the perfect 1-security case that requires a much larger communication complexity m and also involves a complicated procedure in order to avoid card bias.
Next, we give a general method of obtaining equitable strategies from a single "starting design". First we require some definitions. Proof. Let the symmetric group S n act on D. We obtain a set of designs isomorphic to D. Every one of these designs is a 2-design because a ≥ 3, so the resulting scheme is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy by Lemma 2.8. Every design is also an (a − 1)-design with λ = 1, so Theorem 2.1 implies the scheme is informative for Bob.
Finally, every block is in n!/|Aut(D)| of the resulting set of designs and the total number of designs is equal to γ(n − a + 1). 
Define the permutation π = (0, 1)(2)(3, 4, 6, 7, 5) and let π (and its powers) act on A 0 .
Strategies with c = a − 2
In this section, we focus on (a, b, a−2)-deals that are simultaneously informative for Bob, equitable, and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. Where possible, we weaken our assumption that the strategy is equitable and our assumption of perfect 1-security to achieve the given result. We do assume that the strategies discussed are informative throughout these results, although we may not re-emphasize this point in the intervening discussion. We begin with some notation.
Consider an (a, b, c)-deal and a corresponding announcement A i . For any point x ∈ X, we define the block neighborhood of x with respect to A i , denoted B i x , to be B i x = {H A ∈ A i : x ∈ H A } and the neighborhood of x with respect to A i , denoted N i (x), to be
For ease of notation, if the choice of A i is understood from context, we sometimes write G for G i , N (x) for N i (x), and B x for B i x . We can also extend these notions as follows. Define B i x 1 ,...,xt = {H A ∈ A i : x 1 , . . . , x t ∈ H A }. That is, we say B i x 1 ,...,xt is the block neighborhood of the set {x 1 , . . . , x t }. Similarly, define the neighborhood of x 1 , . . . , x t , denoted N (x 1 , . . . , x t ) i , to be
If i is understood from context, we refer to B x 1 ,...,xt and N (x 1 , . . . , x t ). We begin with a preliminary lemma concerning block neighborhoods. A simple consequence of an (a, b, a − 2)-strategy being informative is that the intersection of any two distinct block neighborhoods has cardinality less than one. Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 2.1.
An interesting question concerns which hands are possible (i.e., occur with probability greater than zero) for Cathy for any given announcement A i . The following lemma shows that Cathy may hold a subset of any hand H A that appears in A i . We will then extend this result to show that Cathy's hand may consist of a subset of size c − 1 from any hand H A appearing in A i , together with another card z / ∈ H A . Define Y ′ = {x 2 , . . . , x a−1 }, so |Y ′ | = c. Then P(Y ′ , i) consists of all the blocks in A i containing x 1 (except for H A ). In particular, H ′ A ∈ P(Y ′ , i), so this set is nonempty, and therefore Y ′ is a possible hand for Cathy. But if Cathy holds Y ′ , Alice must hold x 1 , which contradicts the security assumption.
Before we generalize Lemma 3.5, we will need the following result, which shows that, given a particular announcement A i and choice of card x, at least two hands in A i must contain x and at least two hands in A i must not contain x. We remark that Albert et al. [1] show a related result, namely that given an informative and weakly 1-secure announcement, each card must appear in at least c + 1 hands. Proof. We proceed by contradiction. We first show there exist H A , H ′ A ∈ A i which contain x. Now, there must be some H A ∈ A i satisfying x ∈ H A , as otherwise
We show in a similar fashion there exist H A , H ′ A ∈ A i which do not contain x. There must be some H A ∈ A i satisfying x / ∈ H A , as otherwise We remark that it is possible to use the above results to show that any hand is actually possible for Cathy in this case. That is, consider an (a, b, c)-strategy such that a−c = 2, which is informative for Bob and weakly 1-secure against Cathy. Given an announcement A i and a hand H C ∈ X c , we can show P(H C , i) = ∅. We do not include the proof here, however, as we do not require this strong of a result for our purposes.
We are now ready to show one of our main results concerning the special case c = a−2. Namely, any (a, b, a − 2)-strategy that is informative, equitable, and perfectly 1-secure also satisfies c = 1: Proof. Consider an announcement A i . Suppose H A = {x 1 , . . . , x a } ∈ A i . First note that a ≥ 3, since c ≥ 1 and a − c = 2.
Let B x 1 be the block neighborhood of x 1 and suppose |B x 1 | = r. Let B x 2 be the block neighborhood of x 2 and suppose |B x 2 | = s. By Lemma 3.6, we have r, s ≥ 2.
Set H C = {x 3 , . . . , x a }. By Lemma 3.5, we have P(H C , i) = ∅. Then we have (by Lemma 3.4), |B x 1 \B H C | = r − 1 and |B x 2 \B H C | = s − 1. By Theorem 2.7, we have |B
Now consider z such that z ∈ N (x 1 ). We show z ∈ N (x 2 ) as well. For the case c = 1, Lemma 3.5 implies we may set H C = {z}. Then if z / ∈ N (x 2 ), by Lemma 3.4, we would have |B x 1 \B H C | = r − 1 and |B x 2 \B H C | = s. By Theorem 2.7, we have r − 1 = s, a contradiction since r = s. It now suffices to consider a ≥ 4. Set H C = {x 4 , . . . , x a , z}; by Lemma 3.7, we have P(H C , i) = ∅, so H C is a possible hand for Cathy. If z / ∈ N (x 2 ), by Lemma 3.4, we would have |B x 1 \B H C | = r − 2 and |B x 2 \B H C | = s − 1. But by Theorem 2.7, we have r − 2 = s − 1, a contradiction since r = s. Therefore z ∈ N (x 2 ).
Suppose
, where H ′ A = H A , and set H C = {z 1 , . . . , z a−2 }. By Lemma 3.4, |B x 1 \B H C | = r − 1. By the above argument, z 1 , . . . , z a−2 ∈ N (x 2 ) and by Lemma 3.4, these points occur in different blocks of x 2 and each point occurs exactly once. So |B x 2 \B H C | = s − (a − 2). By Lemma 3.5, we have P(H C , i) = ∅. So by Theorem 2.7, we have |B x 1 \B H C | = |B x 2 \B H C |, so r − 1 = s − a + 2. Since we also have r = s, this implies a = 3, as desired.
In light of Theorem 3.8, we now focus on (3, n − 4, 1)-strategies that are equitable and perfectly 1-secure. Given this special case, the stronger security assumption allows us to state some useful results concerning the neighborhoods of particular cards. We first show that any two points must have a common neighbor, which provides the basis for a much stronger result concerning neighborhoods. In fact, the neighborhoods of any two distinct points (minus the points themselves) are the same. The next two lemmas are the final ingredients needed for our second main result, namely that announcements in such strategies are necessarily Steiner triple systems. Lemma 3.9. Suppose (a, b, c) = (3, n − 4, 1) and fix a corresponding announcement A i . Suppose that Alice's strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. Then for any distinct x, y ∈ X, there exists z ∈ X such that z ∈ N (x) ∩ N (y).
Proof.
We proceed by contradiction. Let x, y ∈ X and suppose N (x) ∩ N (y) = ∅. We proceed by using a combination of Lemma 3.4 and the results of Theorem 2.7 to count and compare the size of the block neighborhoods of x and y in light of possible hands for Cathy. Recall that, from Cathy's point of view, the block neighborhoods of x and y must have the same size.
Let B x be the block neighborhood of x and suppose |B x | = r. Let B y be the block neighborhood of y and suppose |B y | = s. From Lemma 3.6, we have r, s ≥ 2.
Thus, there must be some ℓ ∈ N (x) such that ℓ / ∈ N (y). By Lemma 3.5, we may set H C = {ℓ}. Consider B x \B H C . By Lemma 3.4 and since ℓ ∈ N (x), we see that |B x \B H C | = |B x | − 1 = r − 1. Since ℓ / ∈ N (y), we have |B y \B H C | = s. Then since Alice's strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy, by Theorem 2.7, we also have |B x \B H C | = |B y \B H C |. This implies s = r − 1.
Similarly, we have some ℓ ′ ∈ N (y) such that ℓ ′ / ∈ N (x). By Lemma 3.5, we may set H C = {ℓ ′ }. By the same argument as above, we have |B y \B H C | = |B y | − 1 = s − 1 and |B x \B H C | = r. Since |B x \B H C | = |B y \B H C |, we conclude s = r + 1.
Thus we have a contradiction. Proof. Let x, y ∈ X be distinct. Let B x be the block neighborhood of x and suppose |B x | = r. Let B y be the block neighborhood of y and suppose |B y | = s. From Lemma 3.6, we have r, s ≥ 2. We use a technique similar to that used in the proof of Lemma 3.9, i.e., counting and comparing the sizes of block neighborhoods. By Lemma 3.9, there exists z ∈ X such that z ∈ N (x) ∩ N (y). We observe that, by Lemma 3.5, we may set H C = {z}. Then we have (by Lemma 3.4) |B x \B H C | = r − 1 and |B y \B H C | = s − 1. By Theorem 2.7, we have |B x \B H C | = |B y \B H C |, so r = s.
We proceed by contradiction. First suppose there is ℓ = x, y such that ℓ ∈ N (x) but ℓ / ∈ N (y). By Lemma 3.5, we may set H C = {ℓ}. We then have (by Lemma 3.4) |B x \B H C | = r − 1 and |B y \B H C | = s. By Theorem 2.7, we have |B x \B H C | = |B y \B H C |, so s = r − 1, a contradiction. This implies that N (x)\{y} ⊆ N (y)\{x}. Now suppose there there is ℓ ′ = x, y such that ℓ ′ ∈ N (y) but ℓ ′ / ∈ N (x). We observe that, by Lemma 3.5, we may set H C = {ℓ ′ }. We then have (by Lemma 3.4) |B x \B H C | = r and |B y \B H C | = s − 1. By Theorem 2.7, we have |B x \B H C | = |B y \B H C |, so r = s − 1, a contradiction. This implies that N (y)\{x} ⊆ N (x)\{y}. We first observe that Lemma 3.4 implies that any pair x, y ∈ X occurs in at most one hand of A i . It remains to show that any pair x, y ∈ X occurs in exactly one hand of A i . Let x, y ∈ X. By Lemma 3.9, there is some point z ∈ X such that z ∈ N (x) ∩ N (y). In particular, x ∈ N (z). By Lemma 3.10, we have N (z)\{y} = N (y)\{z}. Since z ∈ N (y), we see that N (z)\{y} ∪ {z} = N (y). But x = y, z and x ∈ N (z), so we have x ∈ N (y). This gives us the desired result.
We present an interesting example in the case a = 4, c = 2. Chouinard [5] that there is a large set of 2- (13, 4, 1 
Example 3.2. It was proven by
Generalized Notions of Security
We may generalize the definitions of weak and perfect 1-security to weak and perfect δ-security in the natural way.
1. Alice's strategy is weakly δ-secure against Cathy provided that for any δ ′ such that 1 ≤ δ ′ ≤ δ, for any announcement i, for any H C ∈ X c such that P(H C , i) = ∅, and for any
Weak security means that, from Cathy's point of view, any set of δ or fewer elements from X\H C may or may not be held by Alice.
2. Alice's strategy is perfectly δ-secure against Cathy provided that for any δ ′ such that 1 ≤ δ ′ ≤ δ, for any announcement i, for any H C ∈ X c such that P(H C , i) = ∅, and for any x 1 , . . . , x δ ′ ∈ X\H C , it holds that
Perfect security means that, from Cathy's point of view, the probability that any set of δ or fewer cards from X\H C is held by Alice is a constant.
It is obvious that perfect δ-security implies weak δ-security.
The conditions for weak and perfect δ-security depend on the probability distributions p H A and the possible announcements. As before, we will derive simpler, but equivalent, conditions of a combinatorial nature when Alice's strategy is equitable. 
Since (2) (from Lemma 2.6) holds, it immediately follows that
Using Equation (4), we observe that
holds if and only if
This gives the first condition of the theorem. For the second condition of the theorem, we first remark that, if the given security property holds for δ, it will automatically hold for δ ′ such that 1 ≤ δ ′ ≤ δ. This is because the security property for δ says that every δ-subset occurs the same number of times within a certain set of blocks of size |P(H C , i)|. That is, we have a t-design with t = δ. It is a standard result that every t-design is a t ′ -design for all t ′ ≤ t. Thus it suffices to show that, for any announcement i and for any H C ∈ X c such that P(H C , i) = ∅, and for any x 1 , . . . , x δ ∈ X\H C , then
Alice's strategy is perfectly δ-secure against Cathy if and only if the value Pr[x 1 , . . . , x δ ∈ H A |i, H C ] is independent of the δ-subset {x 1 , . . . , x δ }. From (4), this occurs if and only if r x 1 ,...,x δ is independent of the δ-subset {x 1 , . . . , x δ }. We have that
There are equitable (a, b, 1)-strategy is a t-(n, a, λ) design. Then the strategy is perfectly (t − 1)-secure against Cathy. 
Proof. Given an announcement
A i and a point x, there are λ n t a t − n−1 t−1 a−1 t−1 blocks in A i that do not contain x. For any subset S = {x 1 , . . . , x s−1 } ⊂ X\{x} of size s − 1, where 1 ≤ s ≤ t, the subset S is contained in precisely λ n−s+1 t−s+1 a−s+1 t−s−1 − n−s a−s a−s t−s of these blocks.
Strategies with c = a − d
In this section, we generalize the results of Section 3.1. That is, we consider the case of (a, b, a − d)-deals that are simultaneously informative for Bob and perfectly (d−1)-secure against Cathy. Where possible, we weaken our assumption that the strategy is equitable and satisfies perfect (d − 1)-security to achieve the given result. We do assume that the strategies discussed are informative throughout.
Although the results of Section 3.1 are subsumed by the parallel results of this section, we feel it is useful to include both. Section 3.1 provides a good basis for understanding the results of this section; the proofs of the generalized results are much more technical and complicated than those for the simple case where c = a − 2. For readability, we include a list of correspondences between the results of these two sections in Table 1 . The main result of this section is that any (a, b, a − d)-strategy that is informative, equitable, and perfectly (d− 1)-secure also satisfies c = 1; that is, d = a− 1. Moreover, announcements in such strategies are necessarily d-(n, d + 1, 1) designs. To achieve these results, however, we do need an additional assumption; namely that b is sufficiently large. As we will see, taking b ≥ d − 1 suffices. We do not know if this assumption is necessary, however. Consider an (a, b, c)-deal such that a − c = d, and a corresponding announcement A i . Suppose that Alice's strategy is informative for Bob. Then for any distinct x 1 , . . . , x d ∈ X, there is at most one hand H A ∈ A i such that x 1 , . . . ,
Lemma 4.4.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 2.1. Now, since Alice's strategy is weakly (d − 1)-secure against Cathy, there must be some
holds by Lemma 4.4 and ℓ ′ ≤ c holds by construction. Without loss of generality, assume H ′
A contains x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ′ . We now wish to construct a special possible hand for Cathy, say Y ′ , that will allow us to derive a contradiction. That is, we will construct a Y ′ such that
To ensure Y ′ is a possible hand for Cathy, we construct Y ′ using elements that do not appear in H ′ A , so that H ′ A ∈ P(Y ′ , i) and hence P(Y ′ , i) is nonempty. For technical reasons, we pick one element z that occurs in H A but not H ′ A , and ℓ ′ − 1 elements z 1 , . . . , z ℓ ′ −1 that occur outside of both H A and H ′ A , and use these in our construction of Y ′ . Since H A = H ′ A , there is some z ∈ H A such that z / ∈ H ′ A and z is distinct from x ℓ ′ +1 , . . . , x c . To see this, write ℓ = ℓ ′ + t for some t. There are d − t elements in H A \(Y ∪ H ′ A ). Thus d − t ≥ 1 suffices, but necessarily we have t ≤ ℓ ≤ d − 1. From a technical standpoint, we need such a point z for the case c = 1; this will ensure that H A ∩ Y ′ = ∅.
In addition, we may pick distinct z 1 , . . . ,
by construction, so this set is nonempty, and therefore Y ′ is a possible hand for Cathy. Note also that H A / ∈ P(Y ′ , i). Consider the set T = {x c+1 , . . . , x a } ⊂ H A , which contains d elements. Note that at most one of these elements is z, so we may pick a subset 
Proof. This result is only interesting for c ≥ 2. The case c = 1 is follows directly from Lemma 4.5, since for any z ∈ X, there is some hand in A i that contains z.
We proceed by contradiction. Write H A = {x 1 , . . . , x a } and Y = {x 1 , . . . , x c−1 }. Let z ∈ X such that z / ∈ H A . Suppose P(Y ∪ {z}, i) = ∅. Then every hand of A i intersects Y ∪ {z}. Now, since Alice's strategy is weakly (d − 1)-secure against Cathy, there must be some H ′ A ∈ A i such that H ′ A = H A and z / ∈ H ′ A (Lemma 4.6 gives a stronger result). By the above argument, A contains x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ′ . We now wish to construct a special possible hand for Cathy, say Y ′ , that will allow us to derive a contradiction. That is, we will construct a Y ′ such that
To ensure Y ′ is a possible hand for Cathy, we construct Y ′ using elements that do not appear in H ′ A , so that H ′ A ∈ P(Y ′ , i) and hence P(Y ′ , i) is nonempty. For technical reasons, we pick one element z ′ that occurs in H A but not H ′ A , and ℓ ′ − 2 elements z 1 , . . . , z ℓ ′ −2 that occur outside of both H A and H ′ A , and use these in our construction of Y ′ . Since H A = H ′ A , there is some z ′ ∈ H A such that z ′ / ∈ H ′ A and z ′ is distinct from x ℓ ′ +1 , . . . , x c . To see this, write ℓ = ℓ ′ + t for some t. There are d − t elements in H A \(Y ∪ H ′ A ∪ {x c }). Thus d − t ≥ 1 suffices, which holds because t ≤ ℓ ≤ d − 1 by the security assumption. From a technical standpoint, we need such a point z ′ for the case c = 2; this will ensure that H A ∩ Y ′ = ∅.
, which holds by assumption. (Note that we need ℓ ′ − 1 points, not ℓ ′ − 2 points, because z must be distinct from z 1 , . . . , z ℓ ′ −2 , and all are points occurring outside of
A ∈ P(Y ′ , i) by construction, so this set is nonempty, and therefore Y ′ is a possible hand for Cathy. Note also that H A / ∈ P(Y ′ , i). Consider the set T = {x c+1 , . . . , x a } ⊂ H A , which contains d elements. Note that at most one of these elements is z ′ , so we may pick a subset
Since the scheme satisfies (d − 1)-weak security by assumption, T ′ ⊂ H ′′ A for some H ′′ A ∈ P(Y ′ , i). Set H C = {x d+1 , . . . , x a }. By Lemma 4.5, we have P(H C , i) = ∅, so H C is a possible hand for Cathy. Then we have, by Lemma 4.4, |B x 1 ,..., 
Note that H ′′
Similarly, suppose we have some ℓ ′ ∈ N (D ′ ) such that ℓ ′ / ∈ N (D). By Lemma 4.5, we may set H C = {ℓ ′ }. By the same argument as above, we have
The above argument implies a contradiction if there exists both that a good announcement even exists. Our definitions, on the other hand, require that Alice have a (secure) announcement for every possible hand H A ∈ X a . In particular, we argue that it is not possible to formally define or discuss the security of a scheme using definitions that focus on individual announcements.
The authors [1] present several useful results, some of which we have cited in this paper, on the relationships between the parameters a and c, and b and c, as well as bounds on the minimum and maximum number of hands in a good announcement. The focus is on the level of announcements throughout: the authors argue that, to minimize information gained by Cathy, the size of the announcement should be maximized. Moreover, the authors show good announcements exist for some special cases, including using block designs for the case (a, 2, 1), when a ≡ 0, 4 (mod 6) (corresponding to the Steiner triple systems), and using Singer difference sets for the case (a, b, c) , where a and c are given, and b is sufficiently large. A few other small cases are also given.
Atkinson and van Ditmarsch [3] extend these notions to include a new axiom, CA4, which roughly corresponds to our notion of perfect 1-security. That is, the authors recognize the possibility of card occurrence bias in a good announcement, which gives Cathy an advantage in guessing Alice's hand. Axiom CA4 introduces the requirement that, in the set of hands Cathy knows are possible for Alice, each card Cathy does not hold occurs a constant number of times. In this setting, the authors use binary designs to construct a good announcement (also satisfying CA4) for parameters of the form (2 k−1 , 2 k−1 − 1, 1), where k ≥ 3. Atkinson and van Ditmarsch also consider the problem of unbiasing an announcement by applying a protocol that takes the existence of bias into account. An example of two possible methods for achieving this are given for the parameter set (3, 3, 1). We remark that our approach is much simpler and yields nice solutions for the (3, 3, 1) case. In particular, we require fewer announcements and thereby less communication complexity.
Albert et al. [2] investigate both the problem of communicating the entire hand (or state information) and communicating a secret bit. In effect, their notion of card/state safe is similar to our notion of weak 1-security. The analysis includes a sum announcement protocol for the case (k, k, 1), where k ≥ 3; that is, both players announce the sum of their cards modulo 2k + 1. In addition, Albert et al. show that state safe implies bit safe, and pose the interesting open question of whether a protocol for sharing a secret bit implies the existence of a protocol for sharing states/card deals.
Cordòn-Franco et al. [4] focus on the case c = 1, and present a protocol in which Alice and Bob announce the sum of their hands modulo a given (public) integer. The authors deal with the case of the modulus being either n (the size of the deck) or the least prime p larger than n, and show that, by choosing one of these protocols as appropriate, deals of the form (a, b, 1) are secure (in the weak 1-secure sense) and informative. That is, Alice and Bob learn each other's cards, but Cathy does not know any of Alice or Bob's cards afterwards.
Conclusion and Open Problems
We have presented the first formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian cards problem, and have provided rigorous security definitions that capture both basic and extended versions of weak and perfect security notions. Using a combinatorial approach, we are able to give a nice characterization of informative strategies having optimal communication complexity, namely the set of announcements must be equivalent to a large set of t − (n, a, 1)-designs, where t = a − c. We also provide some interesting necessary conditions for certain types of deals to be simultaneously informative and secure. That is, for deals of the form There are many open problems in the area, especially for deals with c > 1. An interesting question is whether we can achieve generalizations of Theorems 3.11 and 3.8 without assuming (d − 1) security. That is, we wish to study the case of deals satisfying c > 1, where perfect 1-security holds. In particular, it is unclear if there even exist protocols that are simultaneously informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy for deals with c > 1.
